Skip to main content
Centre for European Research

The Common Security and Defence Policy: More strategic autonomy within the frame of NATO?

CER’s new intern Giorgia Miccoli explores the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), signed 2017, and its impact on the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as the EU’s relationship with NATO.

Published:
Signing the joint notification on the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)

On 11 December 2017 the Council adopted a decision, accepting the joint notification by twenty-five member states of their willingness to establish a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) within the Union framework. As regulated in the Treaty of the European Union, those member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria can decide to establish a permanent structured cooperation. PESCO presents itself as a permanent framework for closer cooperation, in which each participant prepares and proposes a planning for the national contributions and efforts it will provide. Indeed, in this regard the main difference between the new setting of PESCO and the previous modus operandi is the absence of a voluntary approach.

Twenty-three countries, followed later by Ireland and Portugal, signed a joint notification on 13 November 2017 and forwarded it to the High Representative of the Union and to the Council. PESCO is one of the concrete developments of the latest Global Strategy, presented by the HR Federica Mogherini, which has set new and ambitious goals to achieve in the near future for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Global Strategy’s fil rouge is that defence should gain more strategic autonomy and a stronger European collective security, which is a major development as CSDP is still characterized by a major intergovernmental setting.  

At the same time though, relations between NATO and the EU remain central to the future of CSDP as tighter cooperation with NATO remains one of the five priorities set in the same document.  With this goal in mind, in July 2016 the HR of the Union and the Secretary General of NATO approved the Joint Declaration of Warsaw, outlining seven main areas of cooperation. These comprehend for instance countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including at sea and on migration, exercises and supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity-building efforts. To solidify the progress achieved and to push the relations forward, thirty-four new actions have been proposed at the latest EU and NATO Council. These initiatives respond to the willingness of the EU to consolidate itself as a security provider in Europe and globally, settling once and for all its responsibilities vis-à-vis those of the other great global security actor, NATO. Notwithstanding the recent decision of the UK to exit the Union, Brussels is trying to demonstrate its capabilities to maintain a strong relation with its transatlantic partner.

Therefore, the productivity of the EU since the release of the Global strategy has been exhaustive with regard to defence and security policy, including the creation of the Defence Fund and the annunciation of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). To explore in more details the goals achieved in the field and the consequences of those, regarding EU’s foreign relations and internal governance, and Brexit, we reached Dr. Sarah Wolff, Director of the Centre for European Research at Queen Mary University of London and Dr. Margriet Drent, Coordinator of and Senior Research Fellow at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Research Department.

To whether or not it is possible to talk about a real strategic autonomy when addressing the path the EU is following in security and defence, Dr. Sarah Wolff answers defining PESCO “a real innovation and game changer in the area of EU Defence”. “Yet”, she argues, “participation remains voluntary and it is to be expected, like for CSDP, that it will take time for the socialisation of different armies to make that instrument permanent and structured”. In her opinion, the only way to understand to what extent the EU can actually produce a strategic autonomy and a more coordinated defence is waiting for the implementation. Indeed, “only implementation will tell us to what extent are the participating member states bound by their commitments and especially to what extent it changes the mind-set of defence personnel and experts at national level”.

Concerning PESCO’s priorities, Dr. Wolff focuses the attention on the number of projects included in the December 2017 PESCO declaration, such as the European Medical Command, set up to intervene in case of global health crises, the Harbour & Maritime Surveillance Protection (HARMSPRO) and two projects on Cyber Security. Member states would most probably consent to cooperate in Migration and Cyber security more than in traditional fields of defence cooperation. However, argues Dr. Wolff, the current work of the EUNAVFORMED operation may make question whether PESCO's involvement in maritime security does not blur the lines between internal and external security, since the operation is policing EU's borders and rescuing migrants. As a consequence, this makes necessary for a change of the nature of what EU defence is.

For her part, Dr. Margriet Drent analyses the post-Brexit scenario for NATO, EU and the CSDP, arguing that the relations between these actors are obviously going to change. Nevertheless, despite Brexit, CSDP cooperation is going to strengthen between those countries remaining in the EU. Germany and France, for instance, are able and willing to take the lead in this regard.

Coming back from Brussels, Dr. Drent argues that a lot is currently happening in the Union’s capital city in terms of adaptation for CSDP to work better with reference to member states’ cooperation.
Concerning the UK, how the relations are going to change depends on which third state agreements the EU is going to develop with London and on whether the UK is going to be remain engaged or not. However, as Dr. Drent highlights, a lot of European countries are pushing for a stronger cooperation with NATO, of which London is still going to be a partner, since they see captivating opportunities in keeping the tie strict. This been said, it is still too early to understand how things are going to change in the relations between EU and NATO after the finalization of Britain’s exit from the EU.

Regarding the possibility to see a break between the European core and the more Atlanticist Eastern flank, due to a greater autonomy of the Union provided by PESCO, Dr. Drent states that PESCO itself can benefit also NATO. Indeed, Europe at large is today characterized by two organizations, NATO and the European Union, increasingly working better together. Therefore, it does not matter whether security is better provided through NATO or EU. Although some countries, like France, are more interested in a more autonomous Union, time will prove that the EU cannot work alone without the backing of the United States in particular and NATO in general. To conclude, Dr. Drent argues that the future is going to be characterized by pragmatism, with EU and NATO countries engaged in making security work in Europe.

Blog post written by Giorgia Miccoli, Intern at the Centre for European Research 

Photo credit: Tauno Tõhk (EU2017EE)

 

 

Back to top